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I. JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
The Federal Circuit is a specialized court with generalist aspirations. 
Congress created the Federal Circuit Court from the ashes of the Court of 
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, giving the court 
appellate jurisdiction over the subject matter of its predecessor courts.1 
Pursuant to statute, the Federal Circuit hears appeals from Article I courts, 
such as the International Trade Commission, the Patent Trial and Appeals 
Board, the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board, the Merit Service 
Protection Board, and others.2 District court decisions involving patent 
law are appealed to the Federal Circuit, whose precedents are binding 
nationally.3 Although the Federal Circuit is an intermediate appellate 
* Dr. Shubha Ghosh is the Crandall Melvin Professor of Law and Director of the Intellectual Property 
Commercialization and Innovation Law Curricular Program and the Syracuse Intellectual Property 
Law Institute at the Syracuse University College of Law. His research focuses on the development 
and commercialization of intellectual property and technology as a means of promoting economic 
and social development.  
1. See Joseph R. Re, Brief Overview of the Jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit Under 1295(A)(1), 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 651, 651 (2002); See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, 
The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1989). 
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5)–(14) (2012). 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012). 
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court with final jurisdiction with the Supreme Court, given the volume of 
patent appeals and the limited grant of certiorari by the high court, the 
Federal Circuit is effectively the “Supreme Court of Patent Law.”4 
Even with such detailed and limited domain, the Federal Circuit 
portrays itself as a generalist court. At a March 2018 meeting of the 
Federal Judicial Conference, a number of Federal Circuit judges referred 
to themselves and their colleagues as generalist judges during a plenary 
panel of almost all the judges on the Federal Circuit. There was no dissent 
from this characterization. One avenue through which the Federal Circuit 
has asserted its generalist inclinations is the statutory provision granting 
the court subject matter jurisdiction over claims arising under any act of 
Congress relating to patent or plant variety protection. This language has 
justified Federal Circuit jurisdiction over matters of copyright law, 
trademark law, and state patent law. This expansion of jurisdiction is 
troubling because it allows the Federal Circuit to create precedent that is 
outside its scope of specialization. This article makes the case for stripping 
the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit either through amendment of the 
statute or through judicial interpretation of the existing statute in a manner 
that confers jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction stripping is a controversial topic both politically and 
jurisprudentially.5 The controversies have arisen in politically-charged 
areas such as abortion rights, school integration, and access to the courts.6 
To raise the issue in the context of patent law may seem disproportionate 
to the broader question of separation of legislative and judicial powers. 
But jurisdiction stripping of the Federal Circuit has happened. The 
Supreme Court limited the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over state law 
4. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. ILL. L.
REV. 387, 387 (2001). 
5. David Cole states as follows: 
It is easy to see why scholars have found the issue such a rich one. It presents in stark relief 
the fundamental paradox of a constitutional democracy: how to reconcile the 
antidemocratic character of a Constitution with democratic principles. Congressional 
control over federal jurisdiction is often justified as one of the ways this reconciliation is 
effected. 
David Cole, Jurisdiction and Liberty: Habeas Corpus and Due Process As Limits on Congress’s 
Control of Federal Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2481, 2481 (1998). 
6. See, e.g., John Roberts, Memorandum, Proposals to Divest the Supreme Court of Appellate 
Jurisdiction: An Analysis in Light of Recent Developments in CORRESPONDENCE FILES OF KEN 
STARR, 1981–1983, 66–92, https://www.archives.gov/files/news/john-roberts/accession-60-88-
0498/014-supreme-court-jurisdiction/folder014.pdf [http://perma.cc/W77P-DTTJ] (detailing 
congressional attempts to strip the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in matters of abortion, school 
bussing, discrimination, and more).  
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 52 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 8
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol52/iss2/8
2018] JURISDICTION STRIPPING? 393 
claims in its 2013 Gunn v. Minton decision7 and over patent counterclaims 
to antitrust claims in its 2005 Holmes v. Vornado decision.8 Congress 
overturned the latter decision through the America Invents Act of 2011.9 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction is an active topic and not merely a technical 
one. The concern remains that when the Federal Circuit decides cases 
outside of its subject matter expertise, it is shaping areas of law in ways 
inconsistent with Congress’s intent and potentially creating conflicts with 
other circuits that have jurisdiction over copyright, contract, and 
trademark questions. 
Arising under jurisdiction is justified in terms of efficiency of 
adjudication. If a district court dispute involves patent claims and 
counterclaims, as well as copyright, trademark, or state law contract 
claims relating to the patents, then there is logic to having the Federal 
Circuit hear any appellate issues pertaining to the patent claims and 
related non-patent claims. The problem, however, is identifying which 
law the Federal Circuit should apply to the non-patent claims. Supreme 
Court precedent in the pertinent areas clearly binds the Federal Circuit. 
But in areas where there is no precedent, the court has to look at other 
areas of law. 
For trademark claims, the Federal Circuit might look to its own 
precedent reviewing Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB) decisions, 
one statutory area of the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.10 But for 
questions of trademark infringement, an area outside the scope of the 
PTAB’s purview over registration, the Federal Circuit needs to identify 
the pertinent body of law on which to base its decision.11 A similar 
question arises for copyright and state contract law decisions. With 
respect to trademark infringement and copyright questions, the Federal 
Circuit has ruled that it must look to the precedent of the circuit from 
which the appeal arose.12 But this sister circuit precedent is now filtered 
through the interpretative lens of Federal Circuit judges. With respect to 
contract law, the Federal Circuit seems to revert to general principles of 
law, creating what I have called a federal common law of contracts, 
7. See Joan E. Schaffner, Federal Circuit “Choice of Law”: Erie Through the Looking Glass, 
81 IOWA L. REV. 1173, 1175 (1996) (analyzing Federal Circuit’s choice of law in reviewing state 
court questions); See also Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit As A Federal Court, 54 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1791 (2013). 
8. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). 
9. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
10. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
11. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
12. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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binding future cases arising from the intersection of patent and contract 
claims.13 
Unintentionally, a justification based in efficiency of adjudication 
leads to inefficient, nonuniform, and questionable results. Federal Circuit 
decisions on copyright and trademark laws, fields outside the court’s 
expertise, often add to the confusion rather than providing needed clarity. 
For example, in its decision in Oracle v. Google, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the issue of infringement of copyrighted software.14 Its decision 
for the copyright owner complicated the issues of copyright ownership, 
fair use, and the roles of the judge and jury in determining questions of 
fact and law in the adjudication of copyright questions. While the Federal 
Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals from denial of trademark registration, 
the judges arguably went outside their fields of expertise in addressing 
questions of trademark protection for colors,15 the meaning of geographic 
misdescriptive marks,16 and First Amendment protection for disparaging 
and scandalous speech.17 These ventures into areas that are outside the 
court’s original subject matter expertise do not further the goals of 
efficiency, whether gauged in terms of the costs of adjudication or 
uniformity. Instead, the ventures represent a specialized court trying to fly 
on generalist wings. 
Previous scholarship mapped the confusion cast on state contract law 
by application of the Federal Circuit’s arising under jurisdiction.18 
Whether determining the priority of assignments, interpreting licenses, 
identifying sales, or assessing settlements, the Federal Circuit has 
expanded its jurisdiction to create a federal common law of contract.19 
This article continues that argument but addresses the case for stripping 
the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over contract law claims. The argument 
for jurisdiction stripping presented here in the context of contract law is 
intended to be paradigmatic for other areas such as copyright and 
trademark. While it is understandable that Federal Circuit judges do not 
want to be pigeonholed as lesser than their generalist colleagues on other 
intermediate federal appellate courts, the legal reality is that Congress 
13. See Schaffner, supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
14. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
15. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116, 1128 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (allowing
registration of color pink). 
16. In re California Innovations, Inc., 329 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (introducing materiality 
standard into determination of geographic misdescriptive marks). 
17. See Shubha Ghosh, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal Circuit’s Contract Law
Jurisprudence and IP Federalism, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 536 (2014). 
18. See Schaffner, supra note 7 at 1176–77.
19. California Innovations, 329 F. 3d. 1334.
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created the Federal Circuit for a purpose. Jurisdiction stripping can return 
the court to its original design with the goal of curing some of the 
confusing judgments that can arise once the court strays. 
The case for jurisdiction stripping is set forth in the following 
sections. Section two summarizes the existing argument that the Federal 
Circuit has created a federal common law of contract. Section three makes 
the case for jurisdiction stripping based on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Gunn v. Minton, a decision denying Federal Circuit jurisdiction to state 
legal ethics claims. Section four broadens the argument to address 
concerns about separation of powers and access to the courts. 
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND STATE CONTRACT LAW20
Simultaneous patent assignments are a common problem that the 
United States Supreme Court reviewed in 2011 in Stanford v. Roche.21 
The controversy at the heart of this decision illustrates the federalism 
issues the Federal Circuit’s contract law jurisprudence raises. At issue in 
Roche was research pertaining to AIDS therapies, specifically, the 
ownership of three biomedical patents obtained by Stanford on HIV 
quantification techniques. Although the narrow focus of the case is in the 
field of biotechnology, it has implications for any scientific research area. 
The common practice at issue is an inventor’s signing of multiple 
assignments to various entities with which the inventor works. The Roche 
litigation raises the key practical problem of how to reconcile these 
conflicting legal obligations. 
Dr. Holodniy was a scientist working for Stanford University in the 
field of HIV and AIDS research. As part of his employment with Stanford, 
he signed a standard employment contract under which he “agreed to 
assign” all interests in any inventions that came out of his work to 
Stanford.22 Holodniy’s research required him to work with Cetus to learn 
the company’s technique of polymerase chain reaction (PCR), which is 
used to make copies of DNA sequences. Holodniy, while still employed 
by Stanford, visited Cetus to undertake training. As a visitor, he was 
required to sign a confidentially agreement, which stated that Holodniy 
agreed to and “do[es] hereby assign” all interests in inventions that arose 
20. Pages 7–28 are taken from my article, Short-Circuiting Contract Law: The Federal
Circuit’s Contract Law Jurisprudence and IP Federalism, published in the Journal of the Patent and 
Trademark Office Society. I thank them for their publication and work. 
21. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S.
776 (2011). 
22. Id. at 780. 
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from his work at Cetus.23 Due to Holodniy’s work at Stanford, the 
university received three patents in the field of HIV counting. These 
patents were the basis for the lawsuit. 
Roche acquired Cetus and all of its assets, including legal interests 
in inventions that arose from contract.24 Roche practiced the inventions 
covered by Stanford’s patents, and Stanford sued for patent infringement. 
One of Roche’s defenses to patent infringement was that Stanford did not 
own the patents and therefore could not sue for infringement. The district 
court disagreed and found that Stanford was the owner of the patents. 
Under the terms of the assignment, Stanford had an interest in Holodniy’s 
inventions created after the date of the assignment. Stanford’s interest 
trumped those of Roche because Holodniy, at the time he signed the 
agreement with Cetus, had already assigned his legal rights to the 
invention to Stanford and, consequently, had nothing to convey. 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit ruled that the Bayh-Dole Act25 did not 
grant Stanford any rights to Holodniy’s inventions. Instead, Stanford’s 
rights were based solely on the assignments (contracts) between Stanford 
and its employee. Parsing the language of the assignments, the court ruled 
that Stanford had no right in Holodniy’s invention since Holodniy simply 
agreed to assign his rights at some future time.26 By contrast, Holodniy’s 
agreement with Cetus did transfer rights to Cetus. In the confidentiality 
agreement with Cetus, Holodniy assigned his rights to all future 
inventions to Cetus. This language implied a present transfer of rights as 
opposed to an intention to assign rights in the future. Consequently, Cetus 
had the rights to Holodniy’s inventions, not Stanford. Therefore, Roche 
had ownership of the patented inventions. Stanford had no rights in the 
patents and could not sue for patent infringement. 
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Roche was greeted with much 
consternation.27 Many universities had language similar to Stanford’s in 
employment agreements. These agreements, as written, could be readily 
trumped by another agreement that more clearly used words like hereby. 
Consequently, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari was a 
23. Id. at 781 (alteration in original).
24. Id. 
25. The Bayh-Dole Act addresses intellectual property created using federal funds. Patent and 
Trademark Law Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015.  
26. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d
832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 2009), aff’d, Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular 
Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011). 
27. See Ted Hagelin, The Unintended Consequences of Stanford v. Roche, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 335, 
336 (2011); Robert M. Yeh, The Public Paid for the Invention: Who Owns It?, 27 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 453 (2012). 
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hopeful sign. Not only would the Court’s final ruling be its first on the 
Bayh-Dole Act, but it would overrule what many saw as the Federal 
Circuit’s strained reading of contractual language. 
With so much at stake and such well-heeled actors involved, it was 
perhaps inevitable that the Supreme Court would review the Federal 
Circuit’s decision in Roche. Although the Supreme Court and the Federal 
Circuit have come to opposite conclusions on patent law matters on many 
other occasions,28 they agreed in Roche.29 The Bayh-Dole Act, as the 
Federal Circuit concluded, does not create patent rights in universities.30 
Patent rights are a matter of assignment and other contracts. Furthermore, 
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Federal Circuit regarding 
the respective assignments. 
Justice Sotomayor in a concurring opinion, stated that the Court 
should reconsider the Federal Circuit’s case law on patent assignments.31 
As a procedural matter, however, the issue was not presently before the 
Court. Justice Sotomayor left the matter for another case. Justice Breyer, 
however, was not so reluctant. His view and that of Justice Ginsburg, who 
signed onto his dissent, was that the Court was in a position to reassess 
the Federal Circuit’s case law on patent assignments. The dissenting 
justices declared this case law erroneous and stated their opinion that 
Stanford should have prevailed.32 The dissenting justices set the stage for 
future legal disputes. 
The Federal Circuit based its ruling on the conflicting assignment 
issue in Roche on its 1991 precedent, Filmtec v. Alled Signal.33 Justice 
Breyer questions this decision because of inconsistency with prior law. 
The Federal Circuit ruled in Filmtec that priority of assignment depends 
upon whether an assignment is a present transfer of a future interest or an 
28. See Ghosh, supra note 17; see also Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
548 U.S. 124, 138 (2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting) (stating, “[A] 
decision from this generalist Court could contribute to the important ongoing debate, among both 
specialists and generalists, as to whether the patent system, as currently administered and enforced, 
adequately reflects the ‘careful balance’ that ‘the federal patent laws . . . embod[y].’” (alterations in 
original) (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989))); see 
also Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Systems, Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002) (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (stating, “[O]ccasional decisions [on issues of 
patent law] by courts with broader jurisdiction will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized 
court may develop an institutional bias.”). As cited in Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit 
Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1505 (2012). 
29. See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563
U.S. 776 (2011) (affirming Federal Circuit). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 794. 
32. Id. at 798–801 
33. Filmtec Corp. v. Allied-Signal Inc., 939 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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intention to transfer a future interest in the future. The future interest at 
issue is the patent, which did not exist when the employee entered into the 
respective contracts. The assignment provisions were a promise to assign 
the patent rights when they arose. If, however, the assignment provision 
was a present transfer, as use of the word hereby would demonstrate, then 
the transfer to the employer is automatic, occurring as soon as the future 
patent rights come into being. In Roche, the Federal Circuit concluded that 
all Stanford had was its employee’s promise to transfer future patent rights 
sometime in the future.34 In contrast, Cetus received a present transfer of 
future patent rights which would come into effect when the patent was 
granted. Therefore, according to the Federal Circuit’s reasoning, Cetus 
and its successor, Roche, owned the patent rights. 
Justice Breyer finds several flaws with the Federal Circuit’s 
reasoning. First, it rests too simplistically on formal language that creates 
a trap for the unwary.35 The Federal Circuit’s announced rule is 
unpredictable and burdens every entity that thought it had the right 
language in its employment contracts, only to be told it did not. 
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit’s reasoning is inconsistent with prior 
law, based in part on state law, that the first assignment (from Holodniy 
to Stanford) would create an equitable interest that would have to be 
weighed against any subsequent assignments. Stanford, as the first 
assignee in time, should win according to this view of patent assignments. 
The Supreme Court, adopting the reasoning of the Federal Circuit, 
has instituted a new rule with respect to conflicting patent assignments: 
Present assignments trump future assignments, even if the present 
assignment is entered into after the future assignment. Justice Breyer finds 
this rule problematic for the reasons explained above. 
When contract issues intersect with patent law in areas such as 
licensing and assignments, the on-sale bar, the first-sale doctrine, and 
settlement agreements, the Federal Circuit has exercised its jurisdiction 
over patent claims to create a body of contract doctrine that is divorced 
from state law or any broader contract policy. Instead, the Federal Circuit 
has emphasized the value of uniformity in patent law to address contract 
disputes within the largely groundless realm of the court’s own common 
law. 
The Federal Circuit’s common law of contract has been far from 
homogeneous. In the area of settlement agreements, for example, the 
Federal Circuit defers to the law of the regional circuit from which the 
34. Roche, 563 U.S at 784. 
35. Id. at 799–800. 
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dispute arose to interpret the terms of the agreement. Furthermore, in areas 
where the Federal Circuit creates its own law, such as the first-sale 
doctrine, patent policies inform the court, consistent with the basis for its 
specialized jurisdiction in patent law (although almost certainly 
inconsistent with other federal laws, such as antitrust law). In the areas of 
licensing, assignments, and the on-sale bar, however, the court creates 
contract rules that do not depend on patent expertise, but instead focus on 
typical transactions among private parties involving the sale or transfer of 
an asset. Uniformity in these last two types of patent cases seems 
overstated as a goal since patent law is arguably not even implicated. 
While the Federal Circuit’s approach to contract law is nominally based 
on the goal of uniformity, the federal common law it has created is neither 
internally consistent nor consistent with the court’s patent expertise. 
Perhaps there is no simple explanation for the origin of the Federal 
Circuit’s contract jurisprudence. One theory is that the court has expanded 
its jurisdictional reach by aggrandizing contract law.36 This hypothesis 
does not seem consistent with the differences among the judges on the 
role of state contract law in the court’s jurisdiction. Arguably, the court 
has not expanded its jurisdiction in other areas of state law such as tort 
law or remedies, which come before the court attendant to patent claims.37 
A stronger theory may lie in how the court views the 
commercialization of patented inventions. On one hand, the goal of 
uniformity may be seen as promoting the goals of the patent owner to 
monetize and commercialize inventions through the system of contract 
law whether in the form of licenses, assignments, or conditioned sales. 
Within the scheme of commercialization, the need for uniform rules to 
guide transactions may serve as a means of maximizing value through 
minimizing the cost of complex and disparate rules. Such an explanation 
is consistent with the court’s treatment of settlement agreements, which 
are outside the purview of the federal common law of contracts previously 
identified. Settlement agreements arguably do not arise in a transactional 
setting. Instead, they serve to resolve litigation that is within the 
jurisdiction of the relevant district court. The Federal Circuit’s deference 
to the interpretative rules of the regional circuit is not a deference to 
private orderings, but to the findings of the district court that must approve 
the settlements. Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s approach to settlement 
agreements does not ostensibly maximize transaction value by creating a 
36. Ghosh, supra note 17. 
37. See, e.g., Waner v. Ford Motor Co., 331 F.3d 851, 855 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (analyzing and
applying state law of unjust enrichment). 
9
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uniform federal law of contract. The goal is to lower the costs of settling 
litigation by deference to local rules. Such cost reduction may indirectly 
have an effect on transaction value maximization, although through a 
mechanism different from the creation of a uniform federal law of 
contract. 
Whatever the positive analysis for the Federal Circuit’s creation of a 
federal common law of contract, the more challenging question is the 
normative desirability of such a body of law. That question is the primary 
focus of this section, and the answer rests on an understanding of the 
intersection of patent law, contract law, and technology policy, with goals 
of promoting progress through invention and commercialization. Explicit 
in this intersection is the role of a specialized federal court whose 
jurisdiction is patent law. 
Arguably, the problem informing this article may vanish if we 
remove the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction. Absent such 
jurisdiction, a court would view the problem of state law as an Erie 
problem38 and would adopt a deference to state law on the underlying 
contract law. A specialized court, however, might view the matter as one 
arising from patent law and resolve the contract law matter as one of its 
specialized body of law. The Federal Circuit has adopted the latter 
approach precisely. The court’s adoption of this approach, however, is not 
inevitable and is inconsistent with federalism both in terms of the structure 
of the United States court system and intellectual property laws. 
The Federal Circuit addressed its own role in the federal court system 
in Atari v. JS & A Group.39 At issue in this decision was the role of 
deference to regional circuits, a point discussed above in the context of 
settlement agreements. The Federal Circuit identified several policies that 
would justify exercising jurisdiction over a federal question related to 
patent law. Uniformity was one of these policies, but the court also 
recognized the policies of preventing forum shopping, avoiding bifurcated 
appeals, and avoiding self-appropriation. The court concluded that it 
could hear the related federal question but should defer to the decisions of 
the relevant regional circuit.40 
38. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 71 (1938). For recent scholarly analysis of Erie, 
see Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531, 1558 (2011) 
(describing areas of specialized federal common law); Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of 
Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 755 (2013) 
(contending that federal courts engage in “under-the-radar” efforts to fashion federal common law). 
39. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
40. Id. 
10
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The Federal Circuit, erroneously, has not taken this position with 
respect to state contract law. Instead, the court has emphasized the policy 
of uniformity while ignoring the other three policies that defer to state 
law. In effect, the court has ignored the Erie doctrine. Under the Supreme 
Court’s 1937 decision in Erie v. Tompkins,41 a federal court ruling on a 
matter of state law under its diversity jurisdiction must apply the law of 
the state from which the dispute arose. Which state law to apply is a matter 
of choice of law principles. What the federal court cannot do, however, is 
create its own federal common law in lieu of the state statutory or common 
law.42 As the Court affirmed in Butner v. United States,43 the Erie doctrine 
applies to a court’s supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims 
attendant to a federal question. The Federal Circuit reveals a fundamental 
error in its understanding of the federal court system by creating its own 
federal common law of contracts. 
A federal court making such a fundamental error seems 
unfathomable. The Federal Circuit characterizes the contract law 
questions it confronts as matters of patent law. An agreement involving a 
patent, whether a license, a sale, or an assignment, entails questions of 
patent law rather than contract law, according to the Federal Circuit.44 
Similarly, the question of whether a patent is on sale, as the Supreme 
Court defined in Pfaff,45 is a matter of patent law rather than contract law. 
While the Federal Circuit’s conceptualization can explain why the court 
has created its own federal law of contract, this explanation cannot justify 
what is a fundamental error. Furthermore, this transformation of state 
41. Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) 
42. The general rule, stated in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) is “[t]here is
no federal general common law.” However, in the area of patent law, as in the area of antitrust,  
“the [Erie] doctrine . . . is inapplicable to those areas of judicial decision within which the 
policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes that legal relations which 
they affect must be deemed governed by federal law having its source in those statutes, 
rather than by local law.” 
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 174 (1942) (holding that a patent licensee could 
raise a Sherman Act claim against patent owner despite any state rules of estoppel against licensee). 
The Patent Act, however, does not contain specific rules relating to interpretations of agreements 
pertaining to patents. Therefore, deference to state contract law would be appropriate. 
43. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979). A possible defense of the Federal Circuit’s 
federal common law of contract may lie in the Supreme Court’s decision in Clearfield Tr. Co. v. 
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (holding that federal law would apply in disputes involving federal 
government property). If patents are viewed as a form of federal government property (such as the 
commercial paper at issue in Clearfield Trust), then there is a case for a federal common law 
pertaining to contracts involving property. But a patent is arguably a federally recognized interest 
vested in a private party. Therefore, the rule of Clearfield Trust would not apply. 
44. Atari, Inc., 747 F.2d at 1422. 
45. Pfaff v. Wells Elec’s., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998). 
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contract law issues into patent law issues conflicts with the established 
case law on patent preemption. Consequently, the Federal Circuit 
compounds its error on the structure of federal courts with an error 
regarding the relative supremacy of patent law and contract law. 
In its Aronson decision,46 the Supreme Court held that patent law 
does not preempt enforcement of a contract governing an unpatentable 
invention. At issue in Aronson was an agreement between an inventor and 
a company that agreed to manufacture and distribute a keychain. Under 
the terms of the agreement, the company agreed to pay a royalty fee based 
on its sales of the keychain, which the inventor sought to patent. If the 
patent was granted, the royalty fee would increase. The patent was denied. 
The company refused to manufacture and sell the keychain because it was 
unpatented and thus competitors could readily copy it. The company’s 
rationale was that a contract on an unpatentable item would undermine the 
federal patent system. The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that 
contracts supplemented the commercialization goals of the patent system 
and the specific escalator clause was consistent with the incentives to 
obtain a patent.47 The company benefitted from being an early seller of 
the product and assumed the risk that the product would not be patentable. 
The Aronson decision should not be read as holding that patent law 
will preempt any contract term. In a prior case, for example, the Court 
held that a contract term requiring payment on a patented invention for a 
period longer than the term of the patent conflicted with patent law.48 In a 
subsequent case, the Court held that a contract term prohibiting a patent 
licensee from challenging the validity of the patent was invalid.49 There 
is no claim that contracts provide a sanctuary from patent law. Instead, the 
Aronson Court emphasized the ways in which contract law can 
supplement patents. Implicit in this view of preemption is the independent 
role of contract law within the federal system of patent law. The Federal 
Circuit ignores this independence by turning contract law questions into 
matters of patent law. In effect, the Federal Circuit ignores the Supreme 
Court’s established precedent on the federalist system of intellectual 
property. Contract law complements federal intellectual property law in 
the promotion of invention and innovation. That lesson summarizes the 
analysis of the previous subsection. 
The detailed discussion of the Federal Circuit’s contract law 
jurisprudence reveals two errors the Aronson Court made, one relating to 
46. See Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
47. Id. at 263.
48. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32 (1964). 
49. See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 659 (1969). 
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the relationship between federal and state courts and one relating to the 
place of contract law in the scheme of federal intellectual property. The 
rest of this section turns to correct these two errors. The solution relies on 
state contract law and a rejection of the federal common law of contract. 
Buttressing this solution are the policies underlying contract law as a 
policy lever for innovation working in tandem with federal intellectual 
property law. This will be the subject of the next two subsections. The 
challenge is identifying mechanisms for reforming the Federal Circuit’s 
contract law jurisprudence. How does one overrule the body of cases 
identified in this article? The last two subsections address these legal 
reform issues by first turning to a reaffirmation of the Supreme Court’s 
preemption jurisprudence and its proper balance between contract and 
patent law. The section concludes with a discussion of statutory and 
judicial reforms which the federalist principles of patent law set forth by 
the Supreme Court informed. 
Patent law does not resolve a market failure resulting from the 
inadequacies of contract law, but instead serves as a body of law that 
supplements contract law in guiding inventors through the creation and 
marketing of new products. Together, the two bodies of law serve as a 
broad system of rules to meet the constitutional goal of promoting 
progress.50 Supreme Court decisions such as Aronson, finding patent law 
did not preempt some contract terms, are consistent with this 
understanding. These decisions are the foundation for the federalist 
conception of intellectual property law. 
Nonetheless, the argument arises for the supremacy of patent law 
over contract law even within this federalist framework. The Federal 
Circuit’s contract decisions presented in sections two and three illustrate 
this supremacy argument. Ultimately, a full assessment of this argument 
would lead to its rejection. This subsection presents the pros and cons of 
the supremacy argument, concluding that the Federal Circuit has taken the 
wrong path in constructing its own contract law. 
What stands out in the Federal Circuit contract opinions is the value 
of uniformity in patent law decisions. While uniformity is an important 
role of federal law, certainly it is not the only goal. Uniformity serves the 
goals of clarity and predictability at the expense of allowing for 
experimentation and development in legal regimes. A uniformly bad rule 
is nonetheless a bad rule, and one that may be difficult to alter. Uniformity 
by itself cannot justify the supremacy of a federal rule over state law. At 
50. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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best, it is an important consequence of supremacy rather than an 
explanation. 
Informing the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on uniformity is the basis 
of the court’s jurisdiction in patent law. Implicit in the argument for 
uniformity is the presumed need for a homogeneous and predictable body 
of law to govern patents. Such predictability may foster creativity and 
inventiveness by providing some degree of certainty in an otherwise 
turbulent and changing economic environment. Having clear rules that do 
not vary by state allows inventors to invest reliably in the process of 
invention and commercialization without the vagaries of the law that may 
deter research and business. Such a fiction of law and the process of 
invention may, in fact, fuel the Federal Circuit’s construction of a uniform 
body of contract law. 
This second argument can be dubbed the patents are special 
justification. In light of the range of legal doctrines involving patents, the 
justification proves excessive. It ignores the ways in which patent law 
itself is unpredictable and uncertain.51 Patentable subject matter,52 
nonobviousness,53 the treatment of prior art,54 and the written description 
requirement55 are examples of the changing winds of patent law. Some of 
the unpredictability may arise from industry-specific applications of 
seemingly general patent rules to particular inventive contexts. Another 
source of the unpredictability of patent law is the shifting view of judges 
as they engage in disagreement within a specific court and across courts. 
To a certain extent, such changes may be predictable, but the vagaries of 
patent law belie the notion that the pronouncements of federal law 
introduce a reign of calm and certainty. 
Even more striking is the unpredictability introduced by federal 
common law because of the vagueness of its source. Writ large, federal 
common law is grounded in the reason of the judge, and some may believe 
that since we all share in reason, different decision makers will come to 
51. See, e.g., Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75
(2005). 
52. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski 
Back to Benson: Preemption, Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 1349 (2011). 
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); See, e.g., Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious Problem: How 
the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 57 (2008). 
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2012); See, e.g., Moshe Wilensky, The Past and Future of
Admitted Prior Art, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 237 (2013). 
55. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s 
Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2009). 
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the same predictable result.56 That theory is far from true. Needless to say, 
all law involves a prediction of what a court might do. In that sense, all 
law is ultimately unpredictable. But there are differences in degree and in 
kind. State common law is grounded in case law and statute. An inventor 
entering into a contract involving a patent might have greater certainty in 
predicting how a particular contract will be enforced under the statutes 
and case law of a particular state than in gleaning the thoughts of a federal 
judge. An issue may arise as to which state law will apply, but the range 
of possibilities might be quite narrow compared to the open field of a 
judge’s reason applied to a particular contract. Whether or not patents are 
special, there is no reason to think that federal courts provide more 
predictability than state courts. 
A more modest version of the “patents are special” argument is the 
need for uniform contract rules to facilitate patent licensing and other 
means of commercialization. This argument may help to understand why 
the Federal Circuit has created its own law of contracts while refraining 
from creating its own law of other state law areas, such as torts. But many 
of the points discussed above regarding the predictability of patent law 
hold a fortiori in rebutting this argument. While the Federal Circuit’s 
contract jurisprudence creates a uniform body of law that transcends the 
law of the 50 states, it is unclear where the source of this law is adding to 
the unpredictability. Furthermore, at the outset, parties to a contract 
involving a patent may not know where any future disputes will be 
litigated. The venue may be one of the several state courts or a federal 
court. The case may be litigated as a patent matter or it may not be.57 If 
not, the Federal Circuit will not be implicated. While the range of this 
uncertainty may not be as broad as I depict, it is unclear whether a uniform 
Federal Circuit law of contracts makes matters more predictable. Instead, 
it may just add another contingency to the legal regime for which the 
parties have to prepare. 
56. To phrase it more elegantly: 
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a 
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be 
governed. 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
57. See 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, CORBIN ON CONTRACT § 51.11 272-3 (2008) (describing security 
interests under Article 9); See Lars S. Smith, General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights 
and State-Based Intellectual Property As Collateral Under U.C.C. Revised Article 9, 22 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 95, 99 (2005). 
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Uniformity is an unsatisfactory foundation for the supremacy of 
federal over state law with respect to contracts involving patents, even 
when supplemented with arguments pertaining to patents and patent 
licensing. A consideration of intellectual property regimes other than 
patents demonstrates a more deferential approach to contract law. Neither 
copyright cases nor trademark cases are subject to specialized appellate 
jurisdiction. Instead, the appeal goes to the relevant circuit court of 
appeals. In some situations, copyright and trademark claims that are 
attendant to a patent claim may go to the Federal Circuit.58 When one 
looks at copyright and trademark cases involving contract issues, most 
often in the cases of licenses, sales, or assignments, federal courts do not 
create their own specialized rules of contract law.59 Instead, they defer to 
the contract law of the state in which the contract arose,60 consistent with 
the Erie61 decision and its progeny. It is unclear why uniformity is any 
less important as a policy in copyright and trademark law than in patent 
law. 
What may explain the differing treatment of contract issues in 
copyright and trademark cases in federal court is the lack of a specialized 
appellate court for these areas of law. There is not a sample of copyright 
or trademark cases involving contracts before the Federal Circuit to test 
the hypothesis of the court’s aggrandizement of contract law as compared 
to other federal appellate courts. With respect to areas of federal law other 
than patent law, the Federal Circuit defers to the law of the regional 
circuit, including any state law issues that that circuit has decided.62 This 
asymmetric treatment of choice of law across intellectual property 
regimes may explain why patent law has been the area in which the 
Federal Circuit has chosen to develop its own specialized contract 
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4) (2012) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals from
Trademark Trial and Appeals Board); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(2) (2012) (Federal Circuit jurisdiction over 
appeals from district court in federal question matters such as copyright or trademark when a patent 
claim or counterclaim has been raised). 
59. Examples of this can be seen in Federal Circuit case law: 
We refer to contractual terms that limit a license’s scope as “conditions,” the breach of 
which constitute copyright infringement. Id. at 1120. We refer to all other license terms as 
“covenants,” the breach of which is actionable only under contract law. Id. We distinguish 
between conditions and covenants according to state contract law, to the extent consistent 
with federal copyright law and policy. Foad Consulting Group v. Musil Govan Azzalino, 
270 F.3d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 2001). 
As cited in MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 939 (9th Cir. 2010); Accord 
Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (treating the copyright license under rules of 
conditions and covenants). 
60. See Blizzard, 629 F.3d 928. 
61. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
62. See, e.g., Sulzer Textil A.G. v. Picanol N.V., 358 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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jurisprudence. Once again, the assumption that patents or patent licenses 
are special does not justify the creation of a federal common law 
pertaining to contracts in those two areas. 
Nor does the Federal Circuit’s specialized jurisdiction over patents 
justify a differential treatment of contracts in patents from other areas of 
intellectual property. If uniformity is the goal, there is arguably a need for 
uniformity across intellectual property regimes as well as within a regime. 
But uniformity is seemingly a straw argument. More to the point, 
specialized jurisdiction does not imply specialized law pertaining to 
contracts involving patents. As a conceptual matter, jurisdiction of a court 
says little about the source of law for deciding a particular case. A federal 
court may look at federal law in some cases and state law in others. 
Similarly, a state court might look to different sources of law based on the 
particular case. Some judges on the Federal Circuit have made the 
conscious decision to create a federal body of contract law as a 
consequence of their exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent matters. 
That decision does not follow logically from the court’s jurisdictional 
grant or from patent law itself. Consistent with Erie and Supreme Court 
precedent on intellectual property preemption, the Federal Circuit should 
apply state law in contract cases involving patents. There is no directive 
from Congress or from the Supreme Court that points to anything 
different. 
The jurisdiction argument leads to the final point of this subsection: 
the implication of preemption doctrine for the Federal Circuit’s approach 
to contract law. Arguably, without using the word preemption, the Federal 
Circuit has created a supreme body of federal contract law that trumps 
state contract law. Such action is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Aronson which held that federal intellectual property law, as a 
general matter, did not preempt state contract law.63 The next section 
elaborates on this point with a thorough exegesis of Supreme Court 
intellectual property preemption cases involving contracts as a step to 
developing a solution to the jurisprudential dilemma the Federal Circuit 
created. 
III. JURISDICTION STRIPPING BY THE SUPREME COURT: GUNN V. MINTON
While the issue of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over contract 
claims has eluded the Supreme Court, the Court’s analysis of its 
jurisdiction over state attorney malpractice claims in Gunn v. Minton64 
63. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
64. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258 (2013). 
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serves as a comparative model for arising under jurisdiction and state 
claims more broadly. In Gunn, the Court rejected the argument that there 
was exclusive federal jurisdiction over attorney malpractice claims when 
the attorney in question is a patent attorney who allegedly mishandled a 
patent law matter. The state court retained jurisdiction over the 
malpractice claim, even if patent issues were superficially involved. 
Implicitly, the Court rejected arguments for the need for uniformity in 
limiting federal jurisdiction and looked instead to the substantive federal 
claim within the state claim. The Court’s focus on substance in Gunn 
provides a model for how courts can limit the expansion of arising under 
jurisdiction to include state law contract claims. Combined with the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the well-pleaded complaint rule in Holmes v. 
Vornado,65 a case concerning Federal Circuit jurisdiction over patent 
counterclaims, the Court’s methodology in Gunn implies that stripping 
Federal Circuit jurisdiction over state contract claims is a possibility. 
Patent owner Minton asserted a patent infringement claim which laid 
the path to the Supreme Court. Minton lost his patent infringement claim 
in federal district court in Texas. The court concluded that his patent was 
invalid under the on-sale bar. Subsequently, Minton brought an attorney 
malpractice suit in state court, alleging his attorneys failed to raise the 
defense that the alleged sale was an experimental use, which would have 
supported the validity of the patent. Minton’s attorneys successfully 
argued that their client would have lost the infringement suit even if the 
experimental use defense had been raised. In his appeal of the trial court’s 
ruling, Minton challenged the trial court’s jurisdiction. He argued that the 
malpractice claim raised a substantive patent law issue over which the 
federal court had exclusive jurisdiction. Minton’s argument was referred 
to the Texas Supreme Court, which ruled in his favor.66 Minton’s 
attorneys, with Gunn as the principal named petitioner, successfully 
obtained review of the Texas Supreme Court ruling from the United States 
Supreme Court, which ruled against Minton. The state court had proper 
jurisdiction, and the malpractice claim did not arise under patent law. 
Arising under jurisdiction is determined through the four-part test set 
forth in Grable v. Darue.67 Under Grable and as the Supreme Court 
summarized in Gunn, 
federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a federal issue is: (1) 
necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable 
65. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
66. Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 251 (2013) 
67. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g and Mfg., 545 U.S. 1158 (2005). 
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of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance 
approved by Congress. Where all four of these requirements are met, we 
held, jurisdiction is proper because there is a “serious federal interest in 
claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum,” 
which can be vindicated without disrupting Congress’s intended 
division of labor between state and federal courts.68 
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Roberts concluded that the first 
two factors are satisfied in Minton’s state law claim. In order to establish 
malpractice, he must show that he would have been successful on his 
patent infringement claim. Therefore, the federal patent law issue is 
necessarily raised in the state claim. Furthermore, the federal issue is 
actually disputed. Minton’s attorneys would argue that the patent 
infringement claim would not be successful. Minton fails to establish 
federal jurisdiction under the last two factors. 
Justice Roberts rules that the patent law issue is not substantial for 
several reasons. Contrary to the reasoning of the Texas Supreme Court, 
Justice Roberts points out: 
it is not enough that the federal issue be significant to the particular 
parties in the immediate suit; that will always be true when the state 
claim “necessarily raise[s]” a disputed federal issue, as Grable 
separately requires. The substantiality inquiry under Grable looks 
instead to the importance of the issue to the federal system as a whole.69 
In Minton’s case, the federal issue is backward looking, meaning that its 
resolution would not affect the prospective validity of the patent, which is 
invalid since the experimental-use defense was not raised in a timely 
manner. The Gunn Court reasoned: 
the question is posed in a merely hypothetical sense: If Minton’s lawyers 
had raised a timely experimental-use argument, would the result in the 
patent infringement proceeding have been different? No matter how the 
state courts resolve that hypothetical “case within a case,” it will not 
change the real-world result of the prior federal patent litigation. 
Minton’s patent will remain invalid.70 
In other words, the federal question in Gunn is not substantial because its 
resolution is relevant to Minton’s state law claim and does not alter his 
patent rights. 
68. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258 (2013). 
69. Id. at 260. 
70. Id. at 261. 
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Furthermore, Justice Roberts did not find that state jurisdiction 
would undermine the goal of uniformity in federal law: 
Nor will allowing state courts to resolve these cases undermine “the 
development of a uniform body of [patent] law.” Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162, 109 S.Ct. 971, 103 
L.Ed.2d 118 (1989). Congress ensured such uniformity by vesting 
exclusive jurisdiction over actual patent cases in the federal district 
courts and exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1338(a), 1295(a)(1). In resolving the nonhypothetical patent 
questions those cases present, the federal courts are of course not bound 
by state court case-within-a-case patent rulings. In any event, the state 
court case-within-a-case inquiry asks what would have happened in the 
prior federal proceeding if a particular argument had been made. In 
answering that question, state courts can be expected to hew closely to 
the pertinent federal precedents. It is those precedents, after all, that 
would have applied had the argument been made.71 
Federal law precedent binds state courts, yet any state court decisions to 
the contrary do not upset federal precedents. The hierarchy of court 
authorities logically prevents any harm to the uniformity of patent law. 
There is little, if any, threat of state courts upsetting uniformity by 
addressing novel questions of patent law. Should a new patent question 
arise in state court, the dynamics of litigation and the supremacy of federal 
law would resolve any problems errant state courts created. As Justice 
Roberts described: 
As for more novel questions of patent law that may arise for the first 
time in a state court “case within a case,” they will at some point be 
decided by a federal court in the context of an actual patent case, with 
review in the Federal Circuit. If the question arises frequently, it will 
soon be resolved within the federal system, laying to rest any contrary 
state court precedent; if it does not arise frequently, it is unlikely to 
implicate substantial federal interests.72 
Justice Roberts offers an analysis of uniformity that, as I elaborate below, 
has implications for arising under jurisdiction over state contract law 
claims. 
Finally, the Gunn Court rejects Minton’s argument that “real-world 
effects” and the need for federal experience make the patent question 
substantial. Any state court rulings about Minton’s patents would not 
71. Id. at 261–262. (internal citations omitted). 
72. Id. at 262. 
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implicate the preclusive effect of res judicata on future patent disputes. 
Justice Roberts writes: 
The Patent and Trademark Office’s Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure provides that res judicata is a proper ground for rejecting a 
patent “only when the earlier decision was a decision of the Board of 
Appeals’ or certain federal reviewing courts, giving no indication that 
state court decisions would have preclusive effect.”73 
Furthermore, the Court cannot “accept the suggestion that the federal 
courts’ greater familiarity with patent law means that legal malpractice 
cases like this one belong in federal court.”74 As the Gunn Court 
concludes, “the possibility that a state court will incorrectly resolve a state 
claim is not, by itself, enough to trigger the federal courts’ exclusive 
patent jurisdiction, even if the potential error finds its root in a 
misunderstanding of patent law.”75 
With respect to the fourth Grable factor, which requires maintaining 
the federal-state balance, the Court found that appropriate balance 
between state and federal responsibilities weighs against federal 
jurisdiction.76 While there is no substantial federal interest in Minton’s 
claim, the state does have a substantial interest in regulating the conduct 
of attorneys within its borders. As the Court in Gunn concludes: “We have 
no reason to suppose that Congress—in establishing exclusive federal 
jurisdiction over patent cases—meant to bar from state courts state legal 
malpractice claims simply because they require resolution of a 
hypothetical patent issue.”77 
Several points from the Gunn decision are relevant to Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over state contract claims: (1) the Court’s characterization of 
Minton’s claim as backward-looking; (2) the approach to a case within a 
case; and (3) the Court’s assessment of uniformity as a basis for 
jurisdiction. The third point connects to the Court’s analysis of arising 
under jurisdiction in its 2005 Holmes decision78, which addressed the 
issue of Federal Circuit jurisdiction over appeals. 
The argument can be made that the Court’s analysis in Gunn applies 
to backward-looking federal questions. Although the Court does not 
explain what backward-looking means, the context in which the term 
appears suggests that the patent issue is backward-looking because the 
73. Id. at 263. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 264. 
77. Id.
78. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
21
Ghosh: Jurisdiction? Stripping?
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2019
412 AKRON LAW REVIEW [52:391 
patent is invalid and a state court’s adjudication of Minton’s malpractice 
claim would not alter Minton’s federal rights. State court review would 
only focus on whether Minton’s attorneys were negligent in failing to 
raise a defense. But a finding of negligence would entitle Minton to 
remedies under state law since the underlying patent claim has been 
resolved and cannot be revived. If it is correct that Gunn applies only to 
backward-looking federal issues, then one may reason that state contract 
law questions involving patents are subject to federal jurisdiction. 
Consider the example of the on-sale bar: whether a transaction involves 
an offer to sell or an actual sale may be a question of state law; resolution 
of that question, however, would affect the rights of the patent owner since 
a finding that the invention was on sale outside the safe-harbor period 
would invalidate the patent. The question is not backward-looking. The 
doctrine of exhaustion provides another example: A sale would exhaust 
the patent owner’s distribution rights and the state issue regarding when a 
transaction constitutes a sale would affect the patent rights of the patent 
owner. The issue is not backward-looking but rather has prospective 
effect. 
But even if Gunn is read so narrowly, some state law contract issues 
may be backward-looking. Such would be the case with resolving patent 
ownership. State rules of assignment priority can affect the ownership of 
a patent. While determining the owner of a patent may ostensibly affect 
prospective rights, the state law question of priority relates back to the 
moment the assignments were made. Therefore, the issue is backward-
looking and, under the narrow reading of Gunn, the subject of state court 
jurisdiction rather than federal. At a minimum, the narrow reading of 
Gunn would strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over some state claims 
that implicate patents. 
However, Gunn should not be read so narrowly. The Court’s analysis 
extends to the substantiality of the federal question and the balance 
between federal and state interests. The broader and more correct reading 
of Gunn supports stripping the arising under jurisdiction for patent-based 
contract claims beyond issues of assignment. As read correctly, the Gunn 
decision speaks to the assessment of federal and state interests when there 
is a “case within a case.” 
Minton’s claim involved a federal question of patent infringement 
embedded within a state law claim of attorney malpractice.79 The Court 
concluded that the patent issue was not substantial in this “case within a 
79. Minton v. Gunn, 301 S.W.3d 702, 704 (Tex. App. 2009), order withdrawn (Oct. 18, 2013), 
rev’d, 355 S.W.3d 634 (Tex. 2011), rev’d, 568 U.S. 251 (2013). 
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case.”80 Patent-related state contract claims are different, however. In 
adjudication over the on-sale bar, priority of assignments, or the 
exhaustion doctrine, the state law issue is embedded within the federal 
patent question. The case within the case is inverted and, arguably, there 
is a less compelling reason for federal jurisdiction over the state law issues 
under the Grable factors. While there is a federal interest in resolution of 
the patent claim, there is also a considerable state interest in uniform and 
predictable contract law, much like the state’s interest in the regulation of 
the legal profession, which the Court recognizes.81 Furthermore, state 
contract law claims are subject to a similar dynamic between state and 
federal law that the Gunn Court describes. If a federal court decides the 
state law issue, the resulting federal decision potentially provides a new 
source of law in resolving future state claims—a source outside the state 
legislative, executive, and judicial processes. A federal common law of 
contract creates anti-democratic pressures that destabilize the 
development of state law. 
One may argue that any instability in state law should be balanced 
against the uniformity required for federal law. This argument is slightly 
different from the Court’s point about uniformity in Gunn, where state 
review of patent law could counter federal court developments. As the 
Gunn Court emphasized, any state court pronouncements have no 
precedential or preclusive effect in federal court because federal courts 
are supreme.82 However, state law decisions may potentially upset patent 
law doctrines such as the on-sale bar or exhaustion doctrine. If state laws 
differ as to what constitutes a sale, patent law would become more 
unpredictable because the force of federal law would depend on the home 
state of the transaction. But uniformity in state contract law may rebut this 
argument. 
Furthermore, the need for uniformity in patent law may be 
overstated. As Justice Scalia stated in the majority opinion in Holmes, 
“Our task here is not to determine what would further Congress’s goal of 
ensuring patent-law uniformity, but to determine what the words of the 
statute must fairly be understood to mean.”83 In Holmes, the Court found 
that the language of the Patent Act in 2002 granted Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction over patent claims but not counterclaims.84 Holmes brought a 
declaratory judgment action in federal district court, seeking a declaration 
80. Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 262 (2013). 
81. Id. at 258.
82. Id. at 263.
83. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 833 (2002). 
84. Id. at 832.
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that it had not infringed Vornado’s trade dress as the company alleged in 
an International Trade Commission (ITC) proceeding.85 Vornado 
counterclaimed for patent infringement. Vornado lost on the trade dress 
claims, and the district court dismissed the patent counterclaim.86 
Vornado appealed to the Federal Circuit, which vacated the district court 
ruling. Holmes then appealed to the Supreme Court, which applied the 
“well-pleaded complaint rule” and concluded that the Federal Circuit 
lacked appellate jurisdiction since the dispute did not involve a patent 
claim. 
Effectively, the Court’s ruling in Holmes promoted lack of 
uniformity in the adjudication of patent claims. Since Vornado filed the 
original complaint in the District Court of Kansas, it should have appealed 
the trade dress and patent issues to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit. Congress did address this anomaly in the America 
Invents Act by extending Federal Circuit jurisdiction to claims and 
counterclaims arising under patent law.87 But the Holmes decision 
demonstrates that courts need not defer to a policy of uniformity in 
determining federal jurisdiction. Instead, a court should strongly consider 
the language of the Patent Act and perhaps Congress’s intent in creating 
a specialized court for patent law88 (although Justice Scalia would not 
accept a reading based on congressional intent). 
Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor issued a joint concurrence favoring 
a position that would have been more advantageous to Federal Circuit 
jurisdiction, illustrating the many dimensions of the uniformity 
arguments. The concurring justices emphasized Congress’s goal in 
creating the Federal Circuit: 
The sole question presented here concerns Congress’s allocation of 
adjudicatory authority among the federal courts of appeals. At that 
appellate level, Congress sought to eliminate forum shopping and to 
advance uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal patent 
law.89 
Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor would find Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
over patent counterclaims if the district court had fully adjudicated them. 
In Holmes, however, since the district court dismissed Vornado’s 
85. Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1140, 1141 (D.
Kan.), dismissed, 232 F.3d 911 (Fed. Cir. 2000), and vacated, 13 F. App’x 961 (Fed. Cir. 2001), 
vacated, 535 U.S. 826 (2002) 
86. Id.
87. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 331 (2011).
88. Holmes, 535 U.S. 826, 833 (2002). 
89. Id. at 840. 
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counterclaim without review, the concurring justices agreed with the 
majority’s decision that the Federal Circuit lacked jurisdiction. Rather, the 
concurrence focused on the manner in which the counterclaims were 
disposed of by the district court and the need to avoid forum shopping in 
patent litigation. Justices Ginsburg and O’Connor offer a policy-oriented 
analysis of jurisdiction—one that goes beyond the face of a well-pleaded 
complaint. 
What Gunn and Holmes teach us is this: jurisdiction stripping of the 
Federal Circuit is possible. These cases also identify viable models of how 
to limit the specialized court’s jurisdiction to patent claims. In Gunn, 
jurisdiction over the attorney malpractice claim rests with the relevant 
state court. In Holmes, appellate jurisdiction over patent counterclaims 
lies with the relevant geographic circuit court. A practical inquiry is how 
the federal courts should treat state contract claims that arise in 
conjunction with patent questions. I argue that arising under jurisdiction 
would not vest the matter in federal courts but rather would require 
adjudication by state courts. The administration of this prescription may 
be impractical. A federal court hearing a patent matter may refer any state 
court issues to the appropriate state court. Alternatively, the federal court 
can defer to the relevant state law as it would in a diversity action. The 
least desirable method is allowing the federal court create its own 
common law of contract solely to promote uniformity of patent law. 
Issues of law and policy regarding jurisdiction stripping are even 
more compelling than the practical issues of implementation. Should 
federal jurisdiction over questions that arguably pertain to federal law be 
restricted? Would such limitation be consistent with the Constitution and 
the legislative intent of Congress? These issues, tacit in the present 
argument, are the focus of the next section. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF JURISDICTION AND SUBSTANCE
Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit just as 
readily as it created it. Under the America Invents Act of 2011, Congress 
expanded arising under jurisdiction to include patent counterclaims in 
addition to patent claims in response to the Court’s ruling in Holmes.90 
What Congress can expand, it can also contract. In response to the 
concerns surrounding a federal common law of contracts set forth in this 
article, Congress should strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction over 
contract issues. Such a result would best accommodate state contract 
90. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 331 (2011). 
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doctrine within patent law. This section sets forth the ways in which 
Congress can limit the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction in light of Supreme 
Court precedent and academic scholarship. 
By stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over patent-based 
contract claims, Congress still permits judicial review. State courts will 
hear the claim, and any federal questions can serve as the basis for federal 
jurisdiction with ultimate review by the Supreme Court. For example, if 
there is a conflict between state contract law and patent law, federal courts 
can still address the conflict under Article VI of the Constitution. For these 
reasons, jurisdiction stripping of the Federal Circuit would not create a 
conflict with Article III of the Constitution by denying access to federal 
courts on federal issues. 
Contract law arises in the patent context in two ways. First, as a 
stand-alone question, contract law issues present as disputes as to the 
formation of an agreement, interpretation of contractual terms, breach of 
contract, or priority of multiple overlapping agreements among different 
parties. These stand-alone contract issues should fall within the 
jurisdiction of state courts, and the Federal Circuit should defer to state 
court rulings in resolving these questions. Second, state contract law 
issues may be incorporated into federal doctrine, such as the on-sale bar. 
In this second category of cases, contract law issues such as whether a 
transaction is a sale or a license, whether an offer has been made, or 
questions of contract formation are incorporated into the federal law. In 
fact, federal law may set forth rules for how to address contract law issues 
by statute or judge-made law. When confronted with these types of 
contract law issues, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction but should look to 
state law precedent for guidance in resolution of the case. In effect, what 
seems to be a state law issue is a federal question. The federal doctrine 
has adopted the language of state contract law in creating a nation-wide 
standard for patent law. 
An attendant issue is distinguishing the two types of cases. For 
example, in patent exhaustion cases, limitations in the sale of a patented 
product will raise questions as to when contract law applies and when 
patent law applies.91 In its recent Lexmark decision, the Supreme Court 
91. The Supreme Court in Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc stated: 
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not necessarily limit LGE’s 
other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not include a breach-of-contract claim, and 
we express no opinion on whether contract damages might be available even though 
exhaustion operates to eliminate patent damages. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 
157 U.S. 659, 666, 15 S. Ct. 738, 39 L. Ed. 848 (1895) (“Whether a patentee may protect 
himself and his assignees by special contracts brought home to the purchasers is not a 
question before us, and upon which we express no opinion. It is, however, obvious that 
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rejected the Federal Circuit’s conditional sale doctrine. The Court ruled 
that a sale would exhaust the patent owner’s distribution rights regardless 
of whether there are conditions on the sale.92 The question remains as to 
how courts should remedy a purchaser or subsequent transferee’s breach 
of the limitation. This example illustrates the first type of cases discussed 
in the previous paragraph with respect to the issue of what constitutes a 
sale. 
I would suggest that this issue be resolved through state law as 
opposed to a federal common law as it is currently. Congress could define 
the term sale in the patent statute, which would convert a type-one case 
into a type-two case. But Congress has not done so. Although the question 
of what constitutes a sale is resolved, the issue of remedy remains. The 
Federal Circuit has created confusing jurisprudence regarding treatment 
of limitations in transfers of patents and patented products by treating 
some limitations as a matter of patent law and some as a matter of contract 
law.93 Some scholars have tried to make sense of Federal Circuit case law 
through the distinction between in personam and in rem rights, with the 
former relegating the limitations to a matter of contract law.94 I cannot 
resolve this problem here, but I have addressed it in other work.95 For the 
purposes of this article, I merely flag the issue and conclude that once 
contract issues are identified, state law should apply. 
Congress can address this problem of Federal Circuit jurisdiction 
over state law issues through jurisdiction stripping. This action would 
entail amendments to § 1295. Such amendments would be consistent with 
Article III, which grants Congress the power to create federal courts along 
certain parameters. Article III, Section I states, “The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior 
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”96 
Section II defines this judicial power as follows: 
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;. . . In all the other 
such a question would arise as a question of contract, and not as one under the inherent 
meaning and effect of the patent laws”). 
553 U.S. 617, 637 (2008). 
92. Impression Prod., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017). 
93. See Andrew C. Michaels, Patent Transfer and the Bundle of Rights, 83 BROOK. L. REV.
933, 937 (2018). 
94. Id. 
95. See SHUBHA GHOSH & IRENE CALBOLI, EXHAUSTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(2018). 
96. U.S. Const. art. III.
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Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under 
such Regulations as the Congress shall make.97 
Congress created the Federal Circuit as an inferior court that has the power 
to decide patent cases. It is important to note that in creating the Federal 
Circuit, Congress effectively stripped sister circuits of the power to hear 
appellate cases involving patent law.98 Congress can allocate appellate 
jurisdiction as it sees fit without infringing upon other provisions of the 
Constitution.99 If Congress determines that some contract law issues are 
not a question of federal law, then the Federal Circuit can be stripped of 
its jurisdiction to hear such cases. Contract law issues can still be heard in 
state courts or in federal courts pursuant to diversity jurisdiction. In either 
case, however, the contract issue must be resolved under state law. 
One criticism of this approach is that litigants might lose the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review. But the high court can still review 
state contract law issues regardless of whether they arise in state court or 
in federal court as a matter of diversity jurisdiction. The question before 
the Court would be whether the contract law determination is consistent 
with federal patent law under Article VI. This question could be one of 
preemption or could be one of interpreting the federal statute and its 
purposes in light of the state law determination. Arguably, Justice 
Breyer’s dissent in Stanford v. Roche would have based Supreme Court 
appellate jurisdiction to hear the priority of assignment issues on Article 
VI.100 How the Supreme Court resolves the state law issue is another
matter. Preemption principles might provide some guidance but would not 
be the sole basis for its decision. Justice Breyer’s dissent suggests 
examining the Federal Circuit approach to priority in light of underlying 
principles of commercial and patent law.101 The outstanding point is that 
my proposal would strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction while 
allowing for Supreme Court review. 
Stripping the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction by limiting its review of 
state contract law issues, while still allowing these issues to be heard in 
97. Id.
98. In creating the Federal Circuit effective October 1, 1982, Congress did allow sister circuits 
to retain jurisdiction over patent cases before that date. See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 
§ 402, 403(e), 96 Stat. 57, 58. 
99. “Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the
enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute 
confers.” Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. 441, 448 (1850). 
 100.  Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 
776 (2011). 
101.  Id. at 794, (Breyer S., dissenting).  
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federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction and preserving the 
opportunity for Supreme Court review, might seem byzantine. But this 
intricacy reflects the unique position of the Federal Circuit as a specialized 
intermediate court of appeals. In this special role, the Federal Circuit can 
exercise its expertise in patent law. But this special role currently allows 
the Federal Circuit to extend its jurisdiction to areas outside its expertise 
such as copyright law or contract law. Furthermore, this extension of 
jurisdiction creates a jurisprudential monopoly over issues that are critical 
for commercial transactions but in which patents play only a small part. 
Limiting Federal Circuit jurisdiction serves to remove this bottleneck in 
the development of law, given the prevalence of patents in all areas of 
technology and many areas of contract. 
Some may argue that my characterization of the Federal Circuit as a 
jurisprudential monopolist undermines the value of uniformity in patent 
law. Others may go further and say jurisdiction stripping would weaken 
the patent incentives for invention and innovation. However, the Federal 
Circuit is not a monopolist, and unification speaks to the authority of the 
Federal Circuit in guiding patent law. This authority underwrites the 
patent system and its incentives to inventors. Of course, I do not seek to 
strip the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction over patent law. Rather, the goal 
of jurisdiction stripping is to limit the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction to its 
designated area of expertise—patent law—and exclude from its 
jurisdiction matters of contract law. Such a limitation can only strengthen 
the Federal Circuit’s credibility and authority. Furthermore, jurisdiction 
stripping ensures that contract law issues are decided pursuant to state law, 
which is predictable, rather than the vagaries of federal common law. This 
can only reinforce the goals of commercializing patents. 
Stanford’s epic loss in Roche provides one illustration. Like other 
universities and corporate entities, Stanford’s assignment policies were 
crafted on an understanding of priority of assignment that the Federal 
Circuit’s hereby rule undermined. Although assignees can respond to this 
new rule, as many have, it would be unwise to ignore how the Federal 
Circuit’s federal common law of assignment priority undermined 
commercial expectations in the name of patent uniformity. Similarly, with 
respect to the on-sale bar issue, the Federal Circuit has addressed the 
question of what constitutes a commercial offer for sale in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pfaff v. Wells.102 The Federal Circuit’s 
creation of a multi-factor test in Pfaff to determine when an invention is 
on sale ignores state law of contract, which could potentially undermine 
102.  Pfaff v. Wells, 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
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commercial expectations. State contract law should be developed through 
state courts even if incorporated into federal questions. 
For these reasons, the value of uniformity should be weighed against 
other values such as the transactional role of patents and the negotiations 
among patent owners, purchasers, and licensees. Jurisdiction stripping is 
one way to promote recognition of these other values by incorporating 
state law into patent disputes. Balancing patent rights with commercial 
negotiations will likely lead to the proper alignment of patent law and 
contract law. Through jurisdiction stripping, questions of contract law do 
not become subsumed under patent law. But as mentioned above and 
discussed in more detail below, Congress could amend patent law to more 
effectively address contract law within the patent statute. As it has done 
in other areas such as securities and antitrust laws, Congress could 
federalize contract law and direct inferior courts on how to implement and 
develop the federal standard. Perhaps direct amendment of the statute is 
more desirable and effective than jurisdiction stripping. More importantly, 
congressional amendment of substantive law is the product of democratic 
deliberation on the role of patents in commercial transactions. Jurisdiction 
stripping is an indirect procedural means to that same substantive end. 
However Congress acts, aligning patent and contract law will 
promote respect for vertical separation of powers between state and 
federal governments.103 As more commercial transactions involve patents, 
the Federal Circuit has greater opportunity to review transactions 
governed by state law. Although it is unlikely that all of commercial law 
would fall under Federal Circuit jurisdiction, expanded federal review 
could upset the balance between federal and state law that has emerged 
over the past two centuries. Through competition among state courts and 
the projects for uniform state laws, commercial law has evolved in a 
direction that has shaped the expectations of parties. As parties 
increasingly negotiate over technology, there is a need to consider both 
federal patent law and state commercial law. A federal common law of 
contracts shifts these expectations without the benefit of democratic 
deliberation. Contracting parties did not expect that the Federal Circuit 
would reshape their expectations. Congressional action, such as 
jurisdiction stripping, can realign the balance between federal and state 
courts. 
One alternative to jurisdiction stripping is for Congress to directly 
amend the Patent Act to address contract issues. Congress has the power 
 103.  See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance 
in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
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to enact such amendments under either its Article I Section 8 Clause 8 or 
Clause 5 powers. Such a legislative pronouncement has the potential to 
more effectively direct the courts on how to handle patent-based contract 
issues. This alternative provides a comparison for assessing jurisdiction 
stripping. Arguably, amending the Patent Act could be a more politically 
palpable option than jurisdiction stripping and could serve as a more direct 
means of shaping the substantive law. 
In conclusion, Congress may be more effective than the Supreme 
Court in stripping the Federal Circuit of its jurisdiction. While the Court 
can act only by resolving cases before it, Congress can adopt a broader 
perspective. But Congress can also act through altering substantive patent 
law directly. Regardless of whether substantive law is altered through 
judicial process or congressional amendments to the Patent Act, we must 
confront the authority of the Federal Circuit. Failing to do so, I conclude, 
is the least desirable option given the stakes for commercial transactions 
involving patents. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Creating procedural hurdles to raise the costs of pursuing legal 
claims can calibrate substantive law. Procedural rules are a policy lever. 
While procedural rules such as pleading requirements and statutes of 
limitation can guide the courts in assessing substantive claims, jurisdiction 
stripping is a draconian means of controlling courts through legislation. 
The jurisdiction-stripping strategy is often the subject of theoretical 
discussion rather than actual implementation. Nonetheless, the strategy is 
used occasionally, as we have seen in the context of habeas corpus and 
access to courts in the war against terror and the management of wartime 
claims. Furthermore, jurisdiction stripping provides a valuable thought 
experiment for assessing substantive issues of law, as we see in the 
Federal Circuit’s management of contract law issues that arise within 
patent disputes. 
This article is intended to guide a reformation of patent law and the 
role of the Federal Circuit. These ends, however, may be best met through 
reformation of the Patent Act itself rather than through its jurisdictional 
arms. As a thought experiment, jurisdiction stripping highlights where the 
source of the contention lies. Substantive legal reform can, as a result, 
address the source of the problem. Needless to say, the current Congress 
may be difficult to persuade on legal reform unless the change restores an 
imaginative order of private patent rights. At a minimum, jurisdiction 
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stripping as a thought experiment reminds us that the Federal Circuit is a 
specialized court, as Congress intended and as Congress can shape. 
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